Two major concerns of recent epistemology are to specify the relations between psychology and epistemology I and to investigate the nature of epistemic justification. 2 In this paper, I attempt to merge these two projects by defending a thesis about the relationship between determining the correct account of epistemic justification and psychological investigation. More specifically, I will argue that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from psychological investigation, that is, apart from knowing some psychological facts about human beings. Let us call this "the thesis of methodological psychologism". I use this label because it is the view that the method for determining the nature of justification involves, at least in part, psychological investigation. 3 Now there is a moderate version of this thesis and a strong version of it, depending on how broadly one construes the extension of 'psychological investigation'. Understood broadly, psychological investigation includes not only the methods accepted and employed by experimental psychologists, but also armchair introspection and the informal observation of one's own and others' behavior outside of the context of a controlled experiment. Taken more narrowly, psychological investigation includes only methods acceptable from the standpoint of scientific psychology. The broad construal of-'psychological investigation' yields a moderate thesis of methodological psychologism. Given the narrow construal, the result is a strong thesis of methodological psychologism.
George Bealer has recently defended a view which appears to commit him to a denial of the moderate thesis of methodological psychologism. Bealer calls the view which seems to have this consequence "the thesis of the autonomy of philosophy". His initial statement of this thesis is that " . . . for (most of) the central truths of philosophy, if it is possible to know these truths to be necessary, it is possible to know then to be necessary absolutely a priori, without the aid of empirical science" (1987, p. 291) . Bealer includes among the central truths of philosophy necessary truths about the nature of knowledge (p. 289). Presumably, he would also include necessary truths about the nature of justification as well. If this is the case, he would hold that determining the nature of justification is a completely a priori matter. Now whether this commits him to a denial of the moderate thesis of methodological psychologism, that psychological investigation broadly construed is required for determining the nature of justification, depends on where he draws the line between a priori knowledge and knowledge provided by empirical science. It seems clear that he intends for these sources of knowledge to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Given this, the question is whether he would place introspection and the informal observation of behavior in the category of a priori methods or in the category of methods of empirical science. Bealer's use of the phrase 'empirical science' suggests that he would include only approved scientific methods in the latter category. However, he assumes that a priori knowledge is based on reason alone (pp. 290,292) . Traditionally, introspection is classified as an a posteriori source of knowledge, a source independent of reason. It seems reasonable, then, to interpret Bealer as understanding empirical science to include psychological investigation in the broad sense, and therefore to attribute to him an implicit denial of the moderate thesis of methodological psychologism.
Although Bealer would probably deny the moderate thesis (and would certainly deny the strong thesis), many other philosophers who deny the relevance of psychological investigation to epistemological tasks such as determining the nature of justification may have only the narrow sense of 'psychological investigation' in mind. If this is the case, their denial would amount only to a rejection of the strong thesis of methodological psychologism and not to a rejection of the moderate thesis. Given this, a defense of the strong thesis would be of more general interest than an argument for the moderate thesis. Accordingly, in what follows I will argue primarily for the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Since the strong thesis entails the moderate thesis, my arguments will support this latter thesis as well. From now on, I will use 'methodological psychologism' to designate only the strong thesis. I will reintroduce the modifiers when it is important to distinguish the two views.
Determining what the correct account of epistemic justification is involves determining what the logically necessary and sufficient condition is, which constitutes the answer to the following question:
( 1) What is the general nature of epistemic justification?
The primary locution which I will use to describe the activity of providing a correct answer to (1) is "giving a correct account of the nature of epistemic justification". Now, of course philosophers are not only concerned with providing true accounts of notions which interest them but also with providing good reasons for thinking that these accounts are true. Thus, I will not only talk about giving a correct account of the nature of epistemic justification, I will also speak of determining the nature of epistemic justification. This latter activity has an epistemological component which is lacking in the former. One determines the correct account of epistemic justification if and only if: (i) one gives the correct account of epistemic justification; and (ii) one has good reasons for thinking that it is the correct account. Given this, the central question which will concern us in this paper is 'What does one need to know in order to determine the correct account of epistemic justification?' In particular, we will consider the following question: (2) Is it possible to determine the correct answer to question (1) apart from psychological investigation?
The thesis of methodological psychologism can be restated as the view that the answer to (2) is "no". According to this thesis, one thing we need to know in order to determine the nature of epistemic justification is some psychological facts about human beings (confirmed by means of the methods of scientific psychology). Before I develop a defense for the thesis of methodological psychologism, I will state a natural line of argument in support of its denial, which I will call the "traditional thesis". This latter argument has quite a bit of appeal. Nevertheless, if the arguments I present in this paper are sound, the following argument is unsound: "Giving a general account of the nature of epistemic justification is just to analyze the concept of epistemic justification. Conceptual analysis is an enterprise which is entirely a priori. As such, there is no need to appeal to any a posteriori considerations, such as those yielded by psychological investigation. Consequently, it is possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from psychological investigation".
Interestingly, other epistemologists who endorse links between psychology and epistemology also accept the conclusion of this argument.
For instance, Alvin Goldman has argued in Epistemology and Cognition that, although cognitive psychology is needed in order to determine the content of epistemic principles, it is not required in the determination of what epistemic justification is (1986, p. 66; 1985, pp. 32-34) . For Goldman, this latter task is at the "foundational" level of the epistemological enterprise. The contribution which cognitive psychology makes to epistemology occurs after the conceptual foundations are constructed (1986, pp. 8-9) . So, in Epistemology and Cognition, Goldman accepts the traditional thesis (the view constituted by an affirmative answer to (2)). The present thesis is that the proper foundation cannot be built by philosophy alone. Psychological investigation (both scientific and nonscientific) is required at that level as well. It is worth emphasizing how surprising it is that even Goldman, who has been one of the foremost contemporary defenders of the importance of psychology for epistemology, denies the thesis of methodological psychologism.
The argument for this claim proceeds in two stages. The first stage is based upon the notion of psychological realism which I will introduce below. The conclusion of the first stage is that the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. In the second stage, I argue that the only way to determine whether a candidate account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic is to appeal to psychological investigation. If these two arguments are sound, it follows that the traditional thesis is false.
S T A G E O N E : T H E C O N S T R
In this first stage of the argument against the traditional thesis (and for the thesis of methodological psychologism), I will argue, on the basis
of a certain anti-skeptical thesis, for what I will call a constraint of realisin on accounts of epistemic justification. This constraint entails a constraint of psychological realism on such accounts. Before going on to the second stage of the argument against the traditional thesis, I will argue that the correct account of epistemic justification requires at least one psychological capacity for justified beliefs and most likely more than one. The conjunction of these claims provides the foundation for the second stage of the argument against the traditional thesis.
A. The Denial of Skepticism About Justification
The first stage of the argument against the traditional thesis rests on the rejection of a certain kind of skepticism. The type of argument I will employ for this anti-skeptical thesis has a long and venerable history in epistemology. 4 The central contention of the philosophers who have taken this anti-skeptical stance is that the considerations advanced on behalf of the thesis of skepticism are always more dubious than the claim that we have knowledge and/or justified beliefs. This treatment of skepticism is often referred to as the "commonsense" tradition in epistemology. Although I will adopt this strategy, my argument requires only the denial of skepticism with respect to the human possession of, and human capacity to possess, justified beliefs.
Here is my argument for the denial of skepticism about justified beliefs: "No skeptical argument which concludes with the claim that human beings are incapable of possessing justified beliefs is such that the premises are more obvious than the denial of the conclusion. That is, it is always more reasonable to hold that humans are capable of having justified beliefs than it is to accept any set of premises which entails that humans are not. One reason that it is clear that humans are capable of having justified beliefs is that it is obvious that many humans actually have some justified beliefs, and having justified beliefs entails being capable of having them. Thus, skepticism is false."
This rejection of skepticism about human justified beliefs does not involve the dismissal of every form of epistemological skepticism. A more serious form of skepticism applies to knowledge. Whereas the skepticism concerning epistemic justification which is being excluded here amounts to the claim that humans are incapable of having justified beliefs, skeptical arguments about knowledge often rely On the logical possibility of widespread false belief. So the possibility of skepticism about knowledge remains even when skepticism about justification is false. 5 Consequently, the position I adopt here shares with the commonsense tradition the rejection of skepticism about justification, but not the rejection of skepticism with respect to knowledge. As we shall see, this denial of skepticism has interesting consequences concerning the connection between epistemology and psychology which have gone largely unnoticed. 6
Many philosophers, such as Goldman, do not share the above approach to skepticism. Goldman states that whether it is humanly possible to have justified beliefs "hinges on the availability or nonavailability of sufficiently reliable (cognitive) processes" (1986, p. 39) . He says this because, on his account of epistemic justification, the possession of sufficiently reliable cognitive processes is a necessary condition for having justified beliefs. What this indicates about Goldman's approach is that, for him, the answer to the question 'What is the nature of epistemic justification?' always has epistemic priority over the answer to the question 'Do human beings have the capacity for justified beliefs?'. Given this epistemic priority, the question concerning the truth of skepticism is left to psychological investigation. If psychological investigation determines that our cognitive processes are sufficiently reliable, then skepticism is false. If psychological investigation concludes that these processes are not sufficiently reliable, then skepticism is true.
I have argued at length elsewhere that it is always more reasonable to believe that some human sometimes knows something than that any particular account of knowledge is correct. 7 If knowledge requires justified belief, then the analogous thesis with respect to justification is supported by this argument as well. If knowledge does not require justified belief, then an analogous argument can be provided for such a thesis about justification. If it is always more reasonable to believe that some human has at least one justified belief than that any account of epistemic justification is correct, then Goldman's approach to skepticism is mistaken. This is because he holds that it is always more reasonable to endorse his account of justification than it is to hold that humans are capable of possessing justified beliefs. This is shown by his willingness to endorse skepticism about justification were psychological investigation to reveal that our processes are generally unreliable.
Although I cannot rehearse here all of my arguments for this thesis of the ongoing epistemological primacy of anti-skepticism about justified beliefs, I will mention one of them. It seems clear that it is more obvious and less controversial that humans have justified beliefs and consequently are capable of having justified beliefs than it is that any particular account of epistemic justification is correct. A non-philosopher would quickly grant that humans have justified beliefs but would be hard-pressed to specify the nature of epistemic justification, s Even among philosophers there is much more agreement that humans have justified beliefs than that any particular account of epistemic justification is correct. There is a notorious lack of agreement in this latter category. It is plausible that if one thesis is more controversial than another, it is more reasonable to accept the latter than to endorse the former. Given this, it is more reasonable to hold that some human sometimes has at least one justified belief than it is to adopt any account of the nature of justification.
Moreover, it is more reasonable to accept this anti-skeptical position than it is to withhold belief about it. This can be seen by considering a belief which Descartes has drawn to our attention, namely, the belief that each of us has concerning our own existence. It is more reasonable for me to hold that I am justified in believing that I exist than that I ought to withhold belief with respect to this epistemic proposition. I invite the reader to compare the analogous doxastic options with respect to himself or herself. The thesis that some normal human is sometimes justified in believing some proposition has an extremely high degree of prior probability which would require an extremely strong counterargument to diminish. After all, this anti-skeptical thesis is quite plausible relative to other anti-skeptical positions such as the view that every human always has many justified beliefs (which is, though less plausible than the former anti-skeptical thesis, quite plausible itself nonetheless). Hence, it is reasonable to adopt the anti-skeptical thesis in question as a continual trump card in epistemological theorizing. I conclude that my approach is more reasonable than Goldman's. 9 Astute readers will be aware that the two methodological alternatives concerning epistemic priority discussed in the preceding paragraphs are not jointly exhaustive. Each approach is to hold that one position is always epistemically prior to the other. Another possible position is to allow that epistemic priority can shift back and forth between the anti-skeptical stance and the account of knowledge in question as one's theorizing proceeds. A method based on this open-ended view of epistemic priority would be akin to the method of reflective equilibrium discussed by Goodman, Rawls, Daniels and others.~° Given this, someone could object that, although I might have provided good grounds above for thinking that the anti-skeptical claim in question is sometimes epistemically prior to any account of the nature of justification, I have not shown that this claim is always epistemically prior to such accounts. It may be reasonable to start one's epistemological theorizing by assuming the commonsense thesis that some human sometimes has at least one justified belief. However, we ought to view the epistemic priority of this claim as only prima facie and hence, subject to defeat.
Given this, there may be stages in one's theorizing about the nature of justification when the epistemic priority passes to a candidate account of justification which, given non-satisfaction of some of its necessary conditions for justification, entails that no human is ever justified in believing anything. According to this objection, we ought to treat the initial epistemic priority of our commonsense anti-skeptical position as provisional. 11
In response to this objection, I would like first to point out that our convictions about the existence of justified beliefs among humans are based on an extensive number of attributions of justified belief to our fellows, of varying degrees of confidence, which we make implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. The intuitive attributions of justified belief which are more than just theoretically defeasible, but also likely candidates for defeat, are ones that we are relatively uncertain about to begin with. Moreover, even if many individual intuitive judgements with high initial plausibility are allowed as dispensable, it does not follow that the view that some human is sometimes justified in believing something will ever be more than just theoretically defeasible, but always undefeated.
The reason for this is easily seen. This anti-skeptical thesis is supported by an indefinite number of intuitive judgments of the highest relative plausibility. It is reasonable to suppose that these judgments form part of the core of intuitive judgments on which accounts of justified belief are based. The dispensable judgments are mostly on the periphery. Moreover, even if some core judgments are rejected, there would still be ample support for the anti-skeptical view in question. Rejecting individual intuitive judgments here and there may commit one to certain restricted forms of skepticism. However, it is quite implausible to think that it would ever be reasonable to reject enough of these judgments to commit one to the unrestricted skepticism we have been discussing. Consequently, it is reasonable to maintain the view that the thesis that some human is sometimes justified in believing something is always epistemically prior to any account of justified belief. 12
B. The Constraints of Realism and Psychological Realism
Given this denial of skepticism, we can generate a criterion of adequacy for accounts of epistemic justification. This is the thesis that no account of epistemic justification is correct which entails that ordinary human beings are incapable of having justified beliefs. That is, no account of epistemic justification which entails skepticism is true. No such view can be true if skepticism is false, and skepticism is false. Another way of stating this criterion of adequacy on accounts of epistemic justification is to say that the correct account of epistemic justification must be realistic with respect to human beings. That is, it must not require of human beings for the possession of at least one justified belief any capacity of any kind which human beings do not possess. An account of epistemic justification is false if it ascribes to ideal human beings the capacity for justified beliefs but denies that real human beings have this capability. If skepticism is false, then humans are capable of having justified beliefs. If humans are capable of having justified beliefs, then the correct account of epistemic justification must be realistic. Since skepticism is false, the correct account of epistemic justification must be realistic. Let us call this constraint "the constraint of realism".
According to the constraint of realism, accounts of epistemic justification must not require for the possession of at least one justified belief any capacity of any kind which human beings do not possess. That is, for any account of epistemic justification A and for any type of capacity C, if A requires C for the possession of justified beliefs, then A must be C-realistic (i.e., humans must have C). In this quantified principle, C ranges over an infinite number of types of capacities. Obviously, for the purpose of evaluating plausible candidate accounts of epistemic justification, we will not be interested in every possible type of capacity over which C ranges. Given our interest in answering question (2), which concerns the relation between determining the nature of epistemic justification and psychological investigation, we can narrow our focus to the following constraint which is entailed by the constraint
The correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. This constraint applies only to psychological capacities. I will refer to it as "the constraint of psychological realism." Since the constraint of psychological realism is entailed by the constraint of realism, ~3 it is also supported by the argument for the constraint of realism, given above, which depends on the rejection of skepticism.t4
The importance of the constraint of psychological realism is a function of the likelihood that the correct account of epistemic justification has a psychological component, that is, that it requires some psychological capacity for the possession of justified beliefs. This becomes apparent when it is realized that any account of epistemic justification which has no psychological component satisfies this constraint by default. If no plausible account of epistemic justification were to incorporate a psychological requirement, then there would never be a need to expend any mental effort to determine whether any plausible account of epistemic justification failed to satisfy the constraint of psychological realism. So the question before us, with respect to the constraint of psychological realism, is this. Given that the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic, is this fact philosophically significant? This question reduces to the following question: Does the correct account of epistemic justification have a psychological component? Does one need to possess at least one psychological capacity in order to have justified beliefs?
C. Episternic Justification and Psychological Capacities
It is clear that there is at least one psychological capacity which must be required for justified belief by an account of epistemic justification in order for that account to be acceptable. This is the capacity to have beliefs. One cannot have a justified belief unless one has a belief. Consequently, one cannot be capable of having justified beliefs unless one is capable of having beliefs. So every acceptable account of epistemic justification incorporates at least one (perhaps implicit) psychological requirement for the possession of justified beliefs. Now this fact makes the constraint of psychological realism more significant than it would be if no plausible account of epistemic justification incorporated any psychological requirement at all for justified belief. Given this required psychological component, no plausible account of epistemic justification will satisfy the constraint by default. However, I take it to be quite obvious that human beings have beliefs and are ipso facto capable of having beliefs.15 Hence, if the capacity for belief-possession were the only psychological requirement incorporated by plausible accounts of epistemic justification, then although the constraint of psychological realism would not be satisfied by default, it would be obviously satisfied, and its significance would still be in doubt. Consequently, this constraint is significant only if some interesting psychological capacity other than the capacity for having beliefs is required for justified belief.
Does the correct account of epistemic justification have a psychological component in addition to this minimally necessary one? There are at least two good reasons for accepting an affirmative answer to this question. The first concerns some general observations about plausible requirements for justified belief. The second is based on an extremely abbreviated survey of the current leading accounts of justification. If the leading accounts which are at least minimally plausible each have a psychological requirement for the possession of justified beliefs, then it is likely that the correct account has such a psychological component.
The first reason to think that there is an interesting psychological component in the correct account of justification is that it is quite plausible to think that a partial account of justification will require for the possession of a justified belief that the belief be related in the right way to the right sort of justifier(s). Moreover, what makes for the right relation and the right sort of ground is, in part, a psychological matter. As for the justificational relation, it is reasonable to think that it will be, at least in part, a psychological relation. Many theorists describe this relation as "the basing relation". The justified belief must be based in the right way on the right sort of justifying ground. This basing relation is most often considered to be at least partially causal in nature. For instance, Alvin Goldman has championed a "causal process" view of epistemic justification according to which a belief is justified only if it is produced or sustained by a reliable causal cognitive process (1979; 1986, pp. 103-109) .16 Hence, on Goldman's view, in addition to being capable of having beliefs, one must have causal psychological processes which produce and sustain one's beliefs in order to have justified beliefs. Reliabilism aside, I think Goldman and others have made a very strong intuitive case for the requirement that a belief cannot be justified unless it is produced or sustained by the right kind of evidence, grounds or process. As Harman has put it, it is not enough merely to have a reason for a belief; one must also believe for that reason. ~7 I may believe that my friend looks angry and believe that he is angry. However, if I believe that he is angry merely because I read it in the tea leaves and not because of my belief about his countenance, then I am not justified in believing that he is angry. Given this, we can say that justified belief requires causal psychological production or maintenance.
In addition to the psychological component of the basing relation, it is clear that not just any reason, ground or process will provide a basis or source adequate to justify a belief, even if it is causally responsible for that belief. Some beliefs are based on fuzzy memory impressions, blurred visual sensations, careless reasoning or wishful thinking. These sources of belief do not generally, and perhaps never, generate justified beliefs. On the other hand, under the appropriate conditions, perception, memory, introspection, and reason can lead to the production of justified beliefs and deductive and inductive reasoning can transmit justification. So justified belief requires the right kind of psychological origin in addition to the appropriate causal psychological production or maintenance.
The second reason for thinking that it is likely that the correct account of justified belief will have at least one interesting psychological component in addition to the requirement of belief capacity is that many, if not all, of the current leading views of justification arguably have such an interesting psychological constraint.~8 I cannot canvass each of the leading views here. Moreover, an exhaustive and in-depth look at the views I will survey is impossible in the present context. However, it will be possible to mention briefly what some of these psychological components are. Current accounts of epistemic justification can be divided along the lines of the internalist/externalist distinction (with some views incorporating both internalist and externalist aspects). It is not necessary for our purposes to provide a rigorous explication of this elusive distinction.~9 Suffice it to say that internalist accounts limit the properties in virtue of which a belief is justified to properties which are in some sense internally accessible to the believer or within the believer's internal perspective. The two main brands of internalism are coherentism and non-coherentist epistemic responsibility views. The leading kinds of externalism are reliabilism and the proper functioning view. As for mixed views, William Alston has recently argued for what he labels an '°internalist externalism". Let us consider each of these types of accounts briefly. Stewart Cohen, in (1984, pp. 285-88) , points out that coherentist accounts of justification such as the one offered by Keith Lehrer in Knowledge (1974) require for the possession of justified perceptual beliefs that people have, in addition to beliefs about perceptual appearances, certain kinds of supporting beliefs such as beliefs about the reliability of their perceptual beliefs. In an attempt to respond to Cohen's charge that this psychological component is psychologically unrealistic, Lehrer appeals to Fodor's notion of the central systems of the mind as a way of accounting for the existence of such beliefs. 2° Lehrer's response indicates his recognition that his view of justification requires a certain kind of cognitive capacity for the possession of justified beliefs. This dispute between Cohen and Lehrer concerning the psychological reality of Lehrer's account (given the psychological component described above) demonstrates their mutual adherence to a constraint of psychological realism on accounts of epistemic justification. Such disagreements underscore the importance of the constraint as an evaluative tool in epistemology.
As for the non-coherentist epistemic responsibility accounts, Alston, in (1985, pp. 64-67) . interprets the view of justification sketched by Roderick Chisholm in Theory of Knowledge 2~ and similar positions by other epistemologists as requiring that one not violate any intellectual obligations in order to possess justified beliefs. These obligations include obligations to believe some things and to refrain from believing others. Alston holds that having such obligations requires that a person be capable of either direct or indirect voluntary control of one's beliefs. Presumably, Alston bases this claim on the reasonable thesis that, as in the ethical domain, one cannot be said to have some obligation unless one is capable of fulfilling the obligation. That is, an epistemic 'ought' implies a psychological 'can'. If this is correct, Chisholm's view and others like it can be correct only if humans have a certain psychological capacity, in this case the capacity of either direct or indirect voluntary control of belief.
Given this brief overview of two representative internalist theories, I turn now to two externalist positions. I have already mentioned Goldman's reliabilist account above. According to the reliabilist account he defends in (1979), a belief is justified only if it is produced or sustained by a reliable cognitive process. This necessary condition incorporates a dual psychological component. In addition to a belief's needing to be produced or sustained by cognitive process, the process in question must be a reliable process. Kornblith, in (1985b, pp. 1t-12) , illustrates how the philosopher who rejects skepticism can subject this necessary condition of Goldman's account to empirical test. This is actually an illustration of the constraint of psychological realism. Alvin Plantinga's "proper functioning" view of justification, which he formulates and defends (1986, 1987, and 1988) , is a relative newcomer on the epistemological scene. Plantinga's position is that a belief is justified for a person only if it is the result of the proper functioning of the person's cognitive equipment in an appropriate environment. Given that whether an environment is appropriate or not is not generally something within a person's ken, this proper functioning view is an externalist account. The psychological requirement here is easy to discern. According to Plantinga, one cannot be justified unless one's cognitive faculties are functioning in the way they were designed to function. Whether or not a person's cognitive equipment is capable of functioning according to design is, in part, a psychological matter.
Alston's "internalist externalism" is, in a nutshell, that " . . . to be justified in believing that p is for that belief to be based on an adequate ground (emphasis his)" (1988, p. 265) . He labels the view internalist because it requires that a belief be based on a ground which is internal to the cognizer and which is, in a sense which he specifies, accessible to the cognizer, a2 The view is externalist because in order for a ground to be adequate it must make the belief it justifies probable. Although there are a number of psychological components in Alston's account, I will point out just one. In the context of discussing the basing relation, Alston says that a belief is based on a ground only if the mechanism which produces that belief takes account of that ground or features of it, and is guided by it. That is, the possession of justified beliefs requires that our belief forming processes be constructed in such a way as to be sensitive to certain features of our grounds for belief and to produce beliefs in such a way that they are formed in light of these features (p. 266). This is a rather specific psychological requirement for justified beliefs which involves complex cognitive processes.
Although each of these accounts has a psychological component requiring a certain psychological capacity for the possession of justified beliefs in addition to the capacity for belief-possession, this may not have been intended by each of these philosophers. Not all psychological components are intended and explicitly stated in accounts of epistemic justification. Whether such components are explicit or implicit, in-tended or unintended, I believe that many, if not all plausible views of epistemic justification and propositional knowledge in the literature contain them. That prominent philosophers have proposed and defended such views is good prima facie evidence that the correct account of epistemic justification contains an interesting psychological component. At any rate, the existence of such views demonstrates that there is an important role for the constraint of psychological realism to play in the testing of candidate accounts of epistemic justification, whether or not psychological investigation is required in the application of this constraint. Let us now turn to an argument for the claim that psychological investigation is' required for the employment of the constraint of psychological realism.
STAGE TWO: THE NEED FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
The above conclusions prepare the way for the second and final stage of the argument against the traditional thesis. The conclusion of this second stage is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemie justification is psychologically realistic apart from psychological investigation. Given the main conclusion of the first stage, that the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic, it seems quite reasonable to suppose that it would not be possible to determine the correct account of epistemic justification without determining whether the account is psychologically realistic. It follows from this consideration and the conclusions of the first and second stages of the argument that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification (i.e., determine the correct account of epistemic justification) apart from psychological investigation. That is, on the basis of these considerations, we can conclude that the traditional thesis is false. However, we have yet to see the argument for the claim that testing an account of epistemic justification for psychological realism requires psychological investigation.
A. The Indispensability of Psychology
Here is the argument for this crucial claim in the case against the traditional thesis. I will refer to this argument as "the indispensability argument" and to its conclusion as "the indispensability thesis". Ac-cording to the constraint of psychological realism, an account of epistemic justification must not require for the possession of justified beliefs a psychological capacity which humans do not have. In order to determine whether a candidate account of justification satisfies this constraint, one must know whether humans possess the cognitive capacities required by the account for justified belief. One cannot know whether humans have some cognitive capacity or other unless one engages in empirical psychological investigation or has access to the results of psychological investigation. Although introspection and informal observation of behavior outside of the context of a controlled experiment may aid in the confirmation or disconfirmation of a psychological claim, these non-scientific methods are not sufficient alone for such confirmation or disconfirmation. Scientific methods are required in addition for these purposes. Consequently, the methods of experimental psychology are indispensable tools in testing accounts of justification for psychological reality. What objections can be raised against this view? I will consider three counterarguments. None of these arguments, as far as I can see, undermines the conclusion of the indispensability argument. In responding to the third objection, I introduce a distinction which not only contributes to showing why the objection fails, but also helps to explain the existence in the literature of psychologically unrealistic accounts of epistemic justification.
B. Three Objections to the Indispensability Argument
Objection 1. One might object to the thesis of the indispensability of psychological investigation by pointing out, as I mentioned earlier, that accounts of epistemic justification with no psychological component whatsoever automatically satisfy the constraint of psychological realism. In cases such as these one can tell immediately that the account satisfies the constraint without doing any psychological investigation. Hence, psychological investigation is not always required for determining whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic.
Although this is indeed the case, the point can be granted without the need to make any significant concessions. As I argued in the previous section, all minimally plausible accounts of epistemic justification must have at least one psychological component. One cannot have justified beliefs without the capacity for possessing beliefs. Fur-thermore, we saw that there are good intuitive grounds for concluding that there are additional more interesting psychological requirements for justified belief. Moreover, most, if not all, at least minimallyplausible leading accounts of justification have such additional more interesting psychological components. Accordingly, we can exclude accounts of epistemic justification which do not have a psychological component at the outset, on the basis of their not satisfying the constraint of intuitiveness, without testing them for psychological reality. So, practically speaking, the question concerning the psychological reality of such accounts does not arise. In light of these considerations, the thesis concerning the indispensability of psychological investigation can be revised to obviate the objection: Psychological investigation is required in order to test accounts of epistemic justification which have at least a prima facie minimal plausibility. For convenience, this qualification will be suppressed in the discussion to follow. Objection 2. Another objection to the thesis of the indispensability of psychological investigation in testing accounts of epistemic justification for psychological reality focuses on accounts which have as their sole psychological requirement for justified belief the capacity for having beliefs. Suppose that we are wondering whether such an account satisfies the constraint of psychological realism. The objector might argue as follows: "It is obvious that human beings have beliefs. Hence, it is equally obvious that humans are capable of having beliefs. If it is obvious that humans are capable of having beliefs, then psychological investigation is not needed to confirm that they are. Therefore, psychological investigation is not required for determining whether humans are capable of having beliefs. If this is the case, then psychological investigation is not always required for testing even initially minimally plausible accounts of epistemic justification for psychological reality". Now if the objector is using 'psychological investigation' in the broad sense, so as to include armchair introspection and informal observation, then this argument fails in virtue of the falsity of the claim that psychological investigation is not needed to confirm the obvious thesis that humans are capable of having beliefs. Regardless of how obvious this thesis is, it is clearly the case that we know it at least on the basis of introspection and the informal observation of other human beings. It is difficult to imagine a basis for knowing that humans are capable of belief-possession, which is available to us, that does not ultimately incorporate at least a partial appeal to -avchological investigation, broadly construed. So if the objector's argument is stated in terms of the broad sense of 'psychological investigation', then the argument is unsound.
However, the argument cannot be a genuine objection to the indispensability thesis unless the extension of 'psychological investigation' is restricted to scientific psychological methods. This is because the indispensability thesis is stated in terms of this narrow sense of the term. Can the objection be undermined when it is stated in terms of scientific methods? It is tempting at this point to rely on the arguments of some critics of folk psychology which are based on the assumption that whether or not humans have beliefs (and other mental states attributed to them on the basis of commonsense psychology) is a matter which must be determined on the basis of scientific psychological investigation, in particular, on the basis of neuropsychological methods. 23 However, I am not sympathetic with this assumption. Instead, the best response to the objector is to stress what I have urged earlier in this paper, viz., that it is plausible to think that the correct account of justification will have at least one interesting psychological component in addition to the requirement of belief capacity. At this point the objector could insist that, even so, there will be accounts with such additional components which can be tested for psychological reality apart from scientific methodology, perhaps on the basis of introspection alone and other informal methods.
In order to meet this objection, it is necessary to point out the inadequacy of armchair introspection and other informal methods alone as means of confirming or disconfirming the existence of the kinds of psychological capacities required for justified beliefs by the leading accounts of justification discussed above. Let us very briefly consider the psychological components of each of these accounts for this purpose.
Lehrer's coherence view in (1974) requires for justified perceptual belief various kinds of additional supporting beliefs such as general beliefs and meta-beliefs. For instance, in order to be justified in believing that there is something red before one, one needs to believe that one is being appeared to redly, that one's beliefs about such appearances are reliable indications of perceptual reality, and that the proposition that there is something red before one is more probable than other competing propositions. It is easy to dismiss Lehrer's view as being psychologically unrealistic on the ground that one has no introspective awareness of such supporting beliefs in normal perceptual experiences. However, Lehrer can insist that the supporting beliefs need not be conscious and occurrent. If this is the case, then unaided introspection and informal observation are powerless to confirm or disconfirm the existence of a capacity for such supporting beliefs. Scientific psychological methods are required for this purpose. Hence, Lehrer's coherence account and others like it cannot be tested for psychological reality apart from the methods of scientific psychology.
Chisholm's account in his (1977), as interpreted by Alston (1985) , requires voluntary control of belief for the possession of justified beliefs. This is because it ascribes intellectual obligations to humans. But these obligations exist only if humans are capable of voluntarily fulfilling the conditions necessary to meet them. That is, they exist only if humans are capable of controlling what it is they believe. As in the case of Lehrer's view, it is easy to charge this view with psychological unreality on the basis of introspective evidence alone. In particular, if we focus on perceptual beliefs, it is clear that we are not capable of believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief about the items in our (unobstructed) perceptual field at wilt. However, it is reasonable to think that introspection can at best reveal to us that we have no direct voluntary control of what we believe in many mundane circumstances. Whether and to what extent we can have indirect voluntary control of our beliefs (by, for example, directing our attention to some evidence or hypotheses to the exclusion of others) is a more complicated matter which requires observation over time and theorizing about the interaction between various kinds of cognitive processes. This latter task is beyond the reach of unaided introspection and other informal methods. It requires experimental methods to perform it. So plausible noncoherentist epistemic responsibility views cannot be tested for psychological reality apart from the methods of scientific psychology.
Goldman's reliabilism in (1979) requires for justified beliefs that they be produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. This view is psychologically realistic only if some of our cognitive processes are indeed reliable. Is it possible to determine whether any of our cognitive processes are reliable on the basis of unaided introspection alone? Hilary Kornblith has recently argued that introspection is unreliable and misleading as a source of knowledge concerning the nature and reliability of our cognitive processes (1989) . He argues that even careful introspection can lead us to think that a process is reliable when experiments in cognitive psychology support the view that the process is unreliable. He cites some psychological studies reported in Nisbett and Ross (1980) in support of this contention. I think it is reasonable to follow Kornblith here. Moreover, there is no good reason for thinking that casual observation of behavior would fare any better than introspection. In (1986), Goldman himself believes that cognitive psychology is required to determine whether or not our cognitive processes are reliable. Given this, it is reasonable to think that reliabilist theories cannot be tested for psychological reality apart from scientific psychological investigation.
According to Plantinga (1986 Plantinga ( , 1987 Plantinga ( , and 1988 ), a belief is warranted for a person only if it is produced by the person's cognitive equipment functioning properly. A person's cognitive faculties are functioning properly only if they are functioning the way they were designed to function. Testing this account for psychological reality requires both knowing what the design plan is in accordance with which our cognitive equipment was designed to function and determining whether our cognitive mechanisms do indeed function according to this design plan. I think it is safe to say that if this information can be acquired at all, it will not be on the basis of introspection alone, nor on the basis of informal observation of behavior. Even if we could use introspection to determine what the design plan is for our cognitive economy, unaided introspection could not be used to determine whether our faculties can operate according to design. Introspection reveals to us various consciously accessible mental contents such as thoughts and sensations. It also reveals some conscious mental processes. However, it cannot be employed to determine the properties of the full range of our cognitive processes since much of what takes place in our minds is due to unconscious processing. Consequently, scientific psychological methods would be required for determining whether our cognitive processes can and do operate according to design.
Finally, Alston's view requires that a belief be justified in virtue of being based on an adequate ground. This basing relation requires the existence of belief-forming mechanisms which are constructed in such a way that they are sensitive to certain features of the grounds. Alston uses the example of a process responsible for producing visual beliefs: " . . . the mechanism is so constituted that the belief f o r m e d . . , will be some, possibly very complex, function of the visual experience input" (1988, p. 266) . The task of determining whether we have such complex visual processes is surely not appropriately left to unaided introspection. Introspection reveals only the outcome of the visual process. The properties of the mechanisms required for producing justified perceptual beliefs must be studied by means of scientific psychology. This is arguably true of the mechanisms which produce non-perceptual beliefs as well.
These five leading accounts each incorporate at least one psychological requirement for the possession of justified beliefs in addition to the requirement for the capacity of belief possession. Moreover, each of these psychological components must be tested for psychological reality by means of the methods of scientific psychology. On the assumption that these accounts are sufficiently representative of views in the literature concerning the nature of justification, I believe these considerations provide a reasonable defense against the above objection that it is possible to test some plausible accounts of justification by introspection alone, apart from the methods of scientific psychology. 24
Objection 3. The final objection was suggested to me by John Pollock (in conversation). If the argument for the indispensability of psychological investigation is sound, then knowing that an account of epistemic justification is intuitive is not sufficient for knowing that it is psychologically realistic. This is because semantic intuitions can yield only a priori knowledge, whereas, if the indispensability argument is sound, a posteriori knowledge is required for testing an account of epistemic justification for psychological reality. Pollock's argument purports to show that intuitiveness is always sufficient for determining that a view of justification is psychologically realistic, even if the view incorporates an interesting psychological component in addition to the requirement concerning belief capacity. The argument proceeds as follows. "If an account of epistemic justification is intuitive, then there is good reason to think that it is true. If there is good reason to think that it is true, then (given the denial of skepticism) there is good reason to think that ;t is psychologically realistic. Consequently, if an account of epistemic justification is intuitive, then there is good reason to think that it is psychologically realistic".
In response to this objection, I would like first to point out that there are at least two ways in which the word 'intuitive' can be understood. What is taken to be an application of a constraint of intuitiveness is sometimes, if not often, an application of the constraint of psychological realism. What explains this is that 'intuitiveness' is being used in these cases in a rather broad sense to include both semantic intuitions and the deliverances of introspection. A narrower sense of 'intuitiveness' includes only appeal to semantic intuitions. When I talk about a constraint of intuitiveness, I intend the word 'intuitiveness' in this latter narrow sense. Hence, when a judgment of "unintuitiveness" is reached about an account of epistemic justification on the basis of introspection, the broader sense of the word is operative and the judgment is based on an application of the constraint of psychological realism. Is Pollock's objection best construed as appealing to the narrow sense of 'intuitiveness' or the broad sense? If 'intuitiveness' is being used here in the broad sense, and the appeal to introspection is doing all the work, then this objection would be the same as the one just considered above. That is, it would be an argument to the effect that it is always possible to determine whether an account of justification is psychologically realistic on the basis of introspection alone. Since I have already responded to that objection, let us see how his objection fares if we take 'intuitiveness' in the narrow sense. Understood in this way, the objection is that it can always be determined whether or not an account of justification is psychologically realistic on completely a priori grounds, apart from any kind of psychological investigation at all.
Before we examine the prospects for his argument construed in this way, let us examine a thesis which is similar to but stronger than his conclusion. A consideration of this similar thesis will put us in a better position to evaluate Pollock's argument interpreted in terms of the narrow sense of 'intuitiveness'. The conclusion of Pollock's argument is that the intuitiveness of an account of epistemic justification would provide us with good reason for thinking that the account is psychologically realistic. The similar but stronger claim is that all (narrowly) intuitive accounts of epistemic justification are psychologically realistic. This latter claim is easily seen to be false. It is surely at least logically possible that an account of epistemic justification be considered intuitive which is nonetheless psychologically unrealistic. That is, it is conceivable that there be an account of epistemic justification which explains and unifies intuitive judgments about justified belief while at the same time requiring for the possession of justified beliefs some psychological capacity which humans do not possess. But this might seem rather odd at first glance. A psychologically unrealistic account of epistemic justification entails skepticism. Someone who rejects skepticism and yet finds such an account intuitive would be in the interesting position of finding an account intuitive which entailed the quite unintuitive result of skepticism. But how could an intuitive account have such an unintuitive result? Furthermore, if a person who denies skepticism accepts a psychologically unrealistic account, then the person accepts a proposition which entails the denial of another proposition the person accepts. Does this count against the conceivability of my claim that an intuitive account can be a psychologically unrealistic account?
I believe that these cases of intuitive account entailing an unintuitive result can be explained in such a way as to show that they are not only conceivable, but likely to happen. As I mentioned above, accounts of epistemic justification can incorporate psychological components either implicitly or explicitly. A psychological component is implicit when it is not explicitly stated in the account but is entailed by what is explicitly stated in the account. For instance, that the capacity to have beliefs is required for the possession of justified beliefs is often implicit in an account of epistemic justification. Although it is difficult to imagine a person failing to notice this implicit psychological component when evaluating an account of epistemic justification, it is easy to imagine someone overlooking a psychological component which is entailed less obviously by an account. 25 If it is possible for someone to evaluate an account of epistemic justification without seeing all of its implicit components, then it seems possible for someone to find an account intuitive which is also psychologically unrealistic. Thus, if a psychological component of an account of justification is implicit and not obvious, then a person could find the account intuitive even though it leads to a skeptical conclusion which the person would deem unintuitive. What about accounts of epistemic justification which have explicit psychological components? The preceding explanation fails to explain how someone could find this kind of account intuitive when it is also psychologically unrealistic. 26 This kind of case requires a different explanation.
The explanation for this possible response to accounts with explicit psychological components employs a distinction between "conditional intuitiveness" and "unconditional intuitiveness". A proposition is conditionally intuitive if and only if its intuitiveness is at least partially a function of a conscious or unconscious psychological assumption. A proposition is unconditionally intuitive if and only if it is intuitive and not conditionally intuitive. This distinction can be used to explain how a person could think that an account of epistemic justification with an explicit psychological component is intuitive even though it entails skepticism (a thesis the person rejects). If a person assumes, consciously or unconsciously, that humans have a certain psychological capacity which they nevertheless do not possess, then an account of justification which requires this capacity may very well seem intuitive to that person. This is because it may explain and unify the person's intuitive judgments about possible cases of justified belief. The intuitiveness of these judgments and of the overall account may depend partially on the psychological assumption. At least, the person's lack of recognition that the assumption is false may prevent her from seeing the skeptical consequences of her view. For instance, it one believes that humans are capable of examining all the contents of their minds at o n c e , z7 then it may not seem unintuitive to one that such a cognitive operation is required for justified belief. Of course, humans are not capable of this, and if such an ability were required for the possession of justified beliefs, no human being would have any justified beliefs. What explains how intuition could endorse an account with a false explicit psychological component such as this is that the account is only conditionally intuitive. For the philosopher who rejects skepticism, discovery of the psychological unreality of the account would undermine this intuitiveness, since it would eliminate the psychological assumption upon which the intuitiveness depends. Given the thesis argued for above, that it is always more reasonable to hold that some normal human sometimes has at least one justified belief than that any account of justification is correct, it would not be reasonable to continue to accept an account given the discovery that it is psychologically unrealistic.
I conclude that, whether an account of epistemic justification has an implicit psychological component or an explicit psychological component, it is at least logically and most likely at least psychologically possible for an intelligent and reasonable person who finds skepticism unintuitive to find such an account intuitive even though it is psychologically unrealistic. Consequently, the claim that all intuitive accounts of epistemic justification are also psychologically realistic is false.
Given the falsity of this thesis, what are the prospects for Pollock's argument for the weaker claim that if an account of justification is intuitive, then there is good reason to believe that it is psychologically realistic? Recall that we are understanding Pollock's argument to be employing 'intuitiveness' in the narrow sense, that is, in the sense which involves appeal only to semantic intuitions. There is a further ambiguity in the argument which needs to be made explicit in order to evaluate it properly. What is the force of 'good reason'? This term can mean either 'sufficient reason' or 'some (less than sufficient) reason'. Let us consider the merits of Pollock's argument on both interpretations.
Let us first examine the version of the argument one gets by construing 'good reason' as 'sufficient reason'. If this version of the argument is sound, it surely defeats the indispensability thesis. If intuition provides us with sufficient grounds for determining whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic, then resorting to psychological investigation for this purpose is unnecessary. The problem with this version of Pollock's argument is that, as interpreted, its conclusion is clearly false. This is because there is more than just the mere psychological possibility for a conditionally intuitive account to be psychologically unrealistic. Intuitions can lead and have led even those who do or would deny skepticism to adopt accounts of epistemic justification which are arguably psychologically unrealistic. 28 After all, what reason is there to think that substantive empirical questions can be answered correctly on the basis of semantic intuitions alone? It seems reasonable, then, to judge the conclusion of Pollock's argument against the indispensability thesis to be false when that argument is construed as being about intuitiveness in the narrow sense and when 'good reason' is taken to mean 'sufficient reason'. Hence, that form of the argument, which would undermine the indispensability argument if it were sound, is unsound. 29 Would Pollock's argument succeed if 'good reason' is interpreted as 'some (less than sufficient) reason'? I will grant that this form of the argument is sound. However, its conclusion falls short of defeating the indispensability argument. The intuitiveness of an account of epistemic justification may be some reason to think that it is psychologically realistic. However, this is consistent with the indispensability of psychological investigation for confirming the psychological reality of the account. Semantic intuitions provide a given account of justification with an initial degree of plausibility. In order to rule out the possibility that the account is only conditionally intuitive and not unconditionally intuitive, one must go beyond narrow intuitions and appeal to psychological investigation to determine whether the theory is psychologically realistic. I conclude that Pollock's objection fails on any reasonable interpretation of its premises and conclusion.
C. Summary of the Argument for Methodological Psychologism
As I said above, if the indispensability thesis is true, then given the constraint of psychological realism and the assumption that one cannot determine the correct account of epistemic justification unless one determines that it is psychologically realistic, it follows that the traditional thesis is false. That is, it follows that one cannot determine the correct account of epistemic justification apart from psychological investigation, narrowly construed. This argument bears repeating in another form: "The correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. If the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic, then one can determine the correct account of epistemic justification only if one determines that the account is psychologically realistic. Hence, one can determine what the correct account of epistemic justification is only if one determines that the account is psychologically realistic. One can determine that a candidate account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic only if one makes use of psychological investigation, narrowly construed. Hence, one can determine what the correct account of epistemic justification is only if one makes use of psychological investigation". This conclusion is the strong thesis of methodological psychologism.
In closing, one further question needs to be addressed. What are the implications of the thesis of methodological psychologism for the argument given above on behalf of the traditional thesis? Obviously, if this argument is valid, and I assume that it is, one or more of the premises must be false. Recall that the argument for the traditional thesis has three premises. The first premise equates giving an account of epistemic justification with analyzing the concept of epistemic justification. The second premise holds that conceptual analysis is an enterprise which is entirely a priori. Finally, the third premise is that if an enterprise is entirely a priori, that is, if it needs to make use of only a priori considerations, then it will not need to make use of any a posteriori considerations. Now I take it that the third premise is necessarily true. Thus, if the thesis of methodological psychologism is correct, it is either the case that giving an account of justification is not just to a n a l y z e t h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 3° o r it is t h e case t h a t c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s is a n activity t h a t is n o t e n t i r e l y a p r i o r i . 31 O f c o u r s e , b o t h of t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s m i g h t b e t r u e . A l t h o u g h it w o u l d b e i n t e r e s t i n g to p u r s u e this q u e s t i o n , I will l e a v e t h a t p r o j e c t f o r a n o t h e r o c c a s i o n . It is e n o u g h to p o i n t o u t h e r e t h a t t h e m a i n t h e s i s o f this p a p e r h a s s o m e q u i t e i n t e r e s t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s . 32 NOTES t See for instance Quine (1969); Harman (1973); Goldman (I978, i985, and 1986 ); Kornblith (i982, 1985a, and 1985b); and Cherniak (1986) . 2 See for instance Lehrer (1974 and Chisholm (1977) ; Goldman (1979, 1986 and [988) ; Kornblith (1983) ; Alston (1985 and i988); Pollock (1986); and Plantinga (1986 and Plantinga ( , 1987 and Plantinga ( , and 1988 . 3 I do not intend this thesis to imply that the epistemologist need engage in psychological investigation himself or herself. What is required is that the epistemologist have access to the appropriate psychological evidence and theories.
4 This approach to skepticism can be found in the writings of Reid (1970, passim) , Moore (1922, p. 163; 1959, p. 144ff.) , and more recently, Harman (1973, pp. 3-7) , Chisholm (1977, pp. 119-34) and Pollock (1974, pp. 1-11 and 1986, pp. 3-7) .
5 Furthermore, the rejection of skepticism concerning human justified beliefs leaves open the possibility of skepticism concerning the capacity of some non-humans or others to possess epistemically justified beliefs. In what follows, I will use "skepticism' to designate skepticism about the capacity of humans to have justified beliefs, unless otherwise noted. 6 Kornblith is a notable exception. In his (1985b, pp. i0-12), he argues that the rejection of skepticism results in epistemology and psychology imposing significant constraints on each other. Although Kornblith's discussion of this thesis is similar in some respects to points made in this paper, there are important differences as well. For instance, he does not affirm that psychological investigation is required for determining the nature of epistemic justification. He is willing to allow that appeal to psychological investigation in answering epistemological questions is nothing more than a practical expedient. 7 Taylor (unpublished) . This paper involves a fuller development of the argument for the constraint of psychological realism than I have space for in the present paper. Cohen has recently argued, in (unpublished) that it is far from clear that non-philosophers possess a concept of epistetnic justification. Furthermore, he contends that there is no single "philosophers' concept" of epistemic justification, but instead different technical uses of the term. He advocates focusing on the concept of knowledge instead. According to Cohen, "'many of the issues discussed under the rubric of justified belief can be located within this more general context" (p. 9). The present project would survive such a shift of attention. The primary revision which would need to be made to the present argument, given such a shift, would be the denial of a form of skepticism which applies to knowledge. This type of skepticism holds that humans are incapable of satisfying the conditions which make true beliefs knowledge. The rejection of this brand of skepticism would be quite similar to the denial of the version of skepticism about the human capacity for justified beliefs. Both leave open the possibility of skepticism concern-ing knowledge which is based on the possibility of widespread false beliefs. A reorientation of our discussion so as to focus on knowledge would result in our central thesis being that it is not possible to determine the nature of knowledge apart from psychological investigation. Of course, this thesis is entailed by the unrevised thesis concerning justification, assuming that justification is required for knowledge and that one cannot know what knowledge is without knowing what justification is. 9 The two approaches I have compared here are analogous to the approaches that Chisholm has labeled "methodism" and "particularism" in 'The Problem of the Criterion ' (1982, chap. 5; see also chap. 7 in Chisholm 1977) . Although Chisholm's focus is knowledge and not justification, one can employ an analogous version of his taxonomy to classify Goldman as a methodist and me as a particularist with respect to determining a general criterion for epistemic justification.
Some have argued that m y approach presupposes Goldman's since "(i) in order to know that there are justified beliefs, one must be able to recognize an instance of a justified belief, and (ii) one cannot do this without already having an explicit criterion for justified beliefs". But surely, although (i) is true, (ii) is arguably false. It is not in general the case that in order to recognize an instance of some type of thing, one must be able to state explicitly what it is to be something of that type. I can think of no good reason why tile special case of justified beliefs should be any different. See Taylor (unpublished) for more argument along these lines. 10 Rawls (1971, p. 20) coined the term 'reflective equilibrium', but attributes the idea to Goodman (see Goodman 1965, chap. 3) . See also Daniels (1979) and for further development of the method. tl I am grateful to two anonymous referees for Synthese for pointing out this objection to me. 12 For a more extended argument for this conclusion, see Taylor (unpublished) . ~3 Since some have attempted to argue that the constraint of psychological realism is not entailed by the constraint of realism, it is important to point out here that the former constraint is a universal instantiation of the latter constraint. Thus, the entailment is a matter of logic, and as such, is not subject to counterexample. 14 Feldman and Conee (1985) argue that "there is no basis for the premise that what is epistemically justified must be restricted to feasible doxastic alternatives" (p. 19). It is important to point out that this is not a denial of the constraint of psychological realism as I have stated it. On Feldman and Conee's account of justified belief, entitled "evidentialism", a doxastic attitude can be justified for a person even if the person does not, and is not capable of possessing that particular attitude. The attitude need only be one which fits the evidence which the person has. So when they say that it is not the case that "what is epistemically justified must be restricted to feasible doxastic alternatives", they are saying that there are possibly but not actually possessed doxastic attitudes which are justified by the evidence a person has. This claim is consistent with my claim that the correct account of justified belief must not require for the possession of at least one justified belief any psychological capacity which humans do not have. I am saying that an account cannot be correct if it excludes humans from the ability to have any justified beliefs. Feldman and Conee are saying that an account can be correct which allows for some beliefs to be justified which humans (or a particular human at a particular time) cannot possess. Whether or not they are right about this, it does not entail the falsity of the constraint of psychological realism.
15 Since the capacity for having justified beliefs entails the capacity for having beliefs, the argument for the constraint of realism (and hence for the constraint of psychological realism) depends for its soundness not only on the rejection of skepticism, but also on the rejection of eliminativism with respect to beliefs. Recall that my main reason for concluding that humans are capable of having justified beliefs was that it is obvious that we actually have justified beliefs. But if eliminativism were true, then we would not and could not have justified beliefs since we would not have any beliefs. I am inclined to treat arguments for eliminativism in the same manner that I treated arguments for skepticism. I cannot imagine any grounds which would be so compelling as to convince me that I do not have any beliefs. But even if some convincing argument for eliminativism were forthcoming, this would not necessarily undermine the argument for the constraints of realism and psychological realism. As long as the argument for eliminativism did not exclude the possibility of there being some mental states with content other than beliefs, the argument for these constraints could be recast in terms of some other contentful mental state besides belief. Although a successful eliminativism excluding all contentful mental states would indeed undermine the argument for the constraints, such an eliminative thesis is even less plausible than eliminativism concerning beliefs. Hence, an argument for the former thesis would need to be even stronger than one for the latter. I doubt that any such argument is forthcoming. 16 This necessary condition is more complicated than this in (1986). 17 Harman (1973, p. 26) . See Lehrer (1974, pp. 122-26) for an opposing position. is Feldman and Conee (1985) defend a view which does not have a psychological requirement for justified belief in addition to the requirement of belief capacity. However, their account fails to be at least minimally intuitive, since it does not incorporate the requirement that the justified belief be based on the justifying evidence or grounds. Thus, their view is not competitive with the others discussed in this paper. 19 See Alston (1986) for a thorough treatment of this distinction. 2o Lehrer and Cohen (1983, pp. 197-201) . For Fodor's view, see Fodor (1983) . Harman (1973, pp. 176-79) attempts to circumvent a similar difficulty with his explanatory coherence view by appealing to the claim that perceptual knowledge involves unconscious inference. Bonjour (1985, pp. 151-52) , like Goldman (1986, p. 39) leaves the possibility of skepticism concerning justification open. Consequently, he can and does consistently admit that his coherence theory of the structure of epistemic justification may be psychologically unrealistic due to its having a psychological component of the sort which Cohen attributes to Lehrer's account. 21 Chisholm (1977) , p. 14. Alston says this of the concept expressed by Chisholm's remarks: "Most of the epistemologists who have attempted to explicate justification have set out a concept of this sort" (p. 60): As examples, in addition to Chisholm, he refers to Ginet (1975) and Wolterstorff (1983) . One could add to this list Bonjour (1980, p. 55 ) who cites Chisholm approvingly in this regard. 22 The kinds, degrees and objects of cognitive access enjoyed by humans are, of course, psychological matters. So to require any kind of cognitive access to the justifiers of a belief for justified belief is to place an important psychological constraint on the possession of justified beliefs. 23 See for instance Churchland (1988, pp. 45-47) . 24 In addition, since none of the theorists who have formulated and defended these five views has appealed explicitly to scientific psychological experiments or theories in order to test his position for psychological reality, none of them has yet provided an adequate argument for his view. 25 For instance, depending on how the view is stated, it may not be initially obvious to some that a given epistemic responsibility account of justification, such as Chisholm's in (1977, p. 14) , places intellectual obligations on people which require for their fulfillment that one be capable of direct or indirect voluntary control of believing and refraining from believing. This psychological component is often implicit in such accounts. 26 Lehrer's account of epistemic justification in (1974) is a good example of one which has an explicit psychological component and which is arguably psychologically unrealistic, 27 This is a simplified version of a psychological thesis which Cherniak (1983; reprinted as 1986, chap. 3) holds is both present in Quine's program for naturalizing the theory of knowledge (see Quine 1960, p. 11 and 1961, pp. 42-44) and "virtually universal in philosophy" (1986, p. 49) . According to Cherniak, "Quine might be described as viewing the entire belief system as contemporaneously fully activated or processed in parallel; the contents of the short-term working memory would be the complete long-term memory" (1986, p. 70) . So, according to Cherniak, Quine's epistemological views contain an interesting psychological component (one which Cherniak argues is psychologically unrealistic). 2s Lehrer (1974) and Harman (1973) are examples of this phenomenon (although Harman focuses on knowledge rather than on justification). 2~ Since the argument is valid, at least one of its premises must be false as well. The second premise is entailed by the constraint of psychological realism, so the first premise must be false. This is the claim that the (narrow) intuitiveness of an account of justification provides sufficient reason for thinking that the account is true. 3(~ Alston (1985, p. 83 , note 1) denies this alternative. With respect to epistemic justification Alston says that " . . . the only reasonable interpretation to be given to "what it is' is 'what is involved in the concept' or "what the term means'". 3~ I would not accept this alternative on the basis either of a rejection of the a priori/a posteriori distinction (see Quine 1961) or an endorsement of the claim that all conceptual analysis is entirely a posteriori. Goldman considers an argument for this latter claim in (1985, pp. 33--34) . Instead, if this premise is false, it is probably due to there being, in addition to an a priori constraint of intuitiveness on conceptual analysis, an a posteriori constraint as well (such as the constraints of realism and psychological realism). 32 Versions of this paper were read at Bowling Green State University, Santa Clara University, the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the APA, 1988, and the annual meeting of the Society of Philosophy and Psychology, 1988 . Each of these presentations resulted in helpful discussions. In addition, I am indebted to members of the philosophy departments at the University of Arizona, Syracuse University, Wellesley College, and Occidental College for constructive comments and criticisms. Finally, I would like to thank Alvin Goldman, Vann McGee, John Pollock, Stephen Schiffer, Jody Kraus and Thomas Senor for extended discussions. These last two are especially to be commended for enduring long hours discussing the issues contained in this paper. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for Synthese who offered extremely helpful, penetrating and detailed comments.
